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Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas 
An Experiment with Police Commissioners 
 
David L. Dickinson, David Masclet, Marie Claire Villeval 
 
 
Abstract: Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical 
student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police 
commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource 
game.  Our experimental design includes treatments where a reward or sanction institution is 
exogenously imposed, as well as treatments with endogenous selection of the norm enforcement 
institution. Compared to a standard student-subject pool, police commissioners cooperate 
significantly more in both games. With exogenous institutions, police commissioners bear a 
higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement 
institution is endogenous, all subjects vote more in favor of rewards over sanctions, but police 
subjects with some work experience are more likely to vote for sanctions. Police subjects also 
reward and sanction more than the others when the institution results from a majority vote.  
Keywords: Norm enforcement, Common Pool Resources, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism, 
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1. Introduction 
When a police officer pulls you over, it is usually bad news.  However, that was not the case for 
some drivers recently stopped in Sandy, Utah. The Sandy Police Department has implemented a 
new program that consists of handing out movie tickets to virtuous motorists who drive safely. A 
similar program has been recently tested in the south of France during the 2014 New Year’s 
celebrations. In this case, police could reward drivers found to be below the blood alcohol driving 
limit by offering them a 20 euro gasoline ticket. These two examples provide insightful 
illustrations of how rewards could be used by police officers to encourage good behavior.1 But 
such examples go against the old paradigm of the corrective policing model (Becker, 1968). 
Police almost exclusively resort to sanctions. While both sanctions and rewards are commonly 
used in several other fields, it is not the case in the realm of law enforcement.2  
An obvious reason why police almost exclusively use sanctions is that it is not natural to 
reward those who simply comply with the law—it makes more sense to reward those who 
outperform a norm.3 Apart from this, there may be three additional reasons in the specific context 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Other similar programs such as the “Pops from Cops” program implemented by the Decatur Police Department, 
Illinois are targeted toward youth. These reward programs consist of giving out coupons for free food, movie tickets 
or entrance to something fun to reward young people for doing something good–wearing a helmet while biking or 
skateboarding, using the crosswalks, skateboarding in designated areas, getting to school on time, speaking 
respectfully, etc. According to a law enforcement officer involved in such program, there may exist several positive 
externalities associated with such programs. According to him: “What's most important is that the ticket is a positive 
event, and when the youth sees the officer the next time, it will start off on a positive note. The ticket is the gateway 
to the relationship. If you reward good behavior, your return on investment will be more good behavior.” 
(http://herald-review.com/news/local/pops-from-cops-coupons-allow-police-to-rewardyouthsgood/article_b19d94ec-
2b1a-11e3-90eb-0019bb2963f4.html). 
2	   For instance, several kinds of rewards including financial rewards or promotions have long been used in 
organizations to motivate workers towards greater productivity (see Lazear, 1995). Firms also commonly use models 
that combine both rewards and sanctions such as the "up or out" model that implies that employees who succeed in 
achieving a certain level of performance are promoted while those who fail to do so must leave the organization. 
3	  While it may be natural to consider as virtuous those employees who outperform the norm (i.e. exert more effort 
than the norm), it is unclear what it means to reward individuals who outperform the law (or help enforce it) in the 
public domain.  
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of norm enforcement to explain why the use of sanctions may be preferred by the police to the 
use of sanctions. Firstly, there may exist a pure framing effect: “destructive” contexts may favor 
sanctions compared to “constructive” contexts.  The intuition is that norm violations involving 
destruction may trigger more negative emotions than norm violations that are apparently more 
passive.4  Secondly, sanctions may be more efficient than rewards at norm enforcement when 
norm violation involves the destruction of wealth. Finally, one may also conjecture the existence 
of a pure police-specific effect. Specifically, police officers are more exposed to destructive 
contexts and disorderly elements of society.  As such, police may have a stronger preference for 
sanctions compared to other individuals because such exposure may induce a bias in favor of 
sanctions (Skolnick, 1995).5  
In this paper, we study norm enforcement (rather than law enforcement) by means of social 
dilemma games, and we analyze whether a population trained in law enforcement behaves 
differently in these decision environments. In particular, we study whether social dilemmas 
framed in a common resource, rather than public goods, context bias individuals towards 
punishment of norm violators, rather than rewarding of non-violators. Social dilemmas are 
popular for studying cooperation and social norms because group welfare is at odds with the 
dominant strategy of selfish free riding behavior in these environments. Early laboratory 
experiments have shown that initial contributions in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) 
games are substantially above the Nash prediction, but decline steadily as the game is repeated 
(Isaac et al., 1984; Andreoni, 1988; Ledyard, 1995). However, cooperation can be sustained in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For example, if a social norm is that public goods be maintained, violation of that norm may be viewed differently 
if it involves destroying an existing public good than if it involves the more passive failure to assist in its provision. 
5	  This idea is well illustrated by the comments of a police officer who was recently involved in the “Pops for Cops” 
program. He said: “Like many professional law enforcement officers, I brought a certain mentality to the job. I 
wanted to hunt down criminals – chase bad guys, kick in doors, get the bust. It was hunter v hunted… I can't escape 
the realities of my job – I have to hunt down criminals. But could I also work on the other end of the spectrum? 
Could I build positive relationships strong enough to keep youth out of trouble?”  
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the long run when punishment is available (Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr and Gächter, 2000).6 This 
finding is robust to various environmental conditions (Masclet et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 2006; 
Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Other studies have attempted to investigated 
the effectiveness of reward mechanisms to enforce the norm of cooperation (Dickinson, 2001; 
Andreoni et al., 2003; Walker and Halloran, 2004; Sefton et al., 2007; Rand et al., 2009; Sutter et 
al., 2010; Dugar, 2013). Most of these results show that rewards are somewhat less effective than 
sanctions in enforcing cooperation. 
The originality of our paper is threefold. First, we investigate the effectiveness of both 
punishment and reward institutions not only in the VCM game, but also in the more destructive 
context of a Common Pool Resource game (CPR). In the CPR game, non-cooperation involves 
active withdrawals from the common pool, whereas in the VCM game non-cooperation involves 
failure to contribute to the public good (Ostrom et al., 1992).  While the effect of sanctions and 
rewards is well documented in the VCM game, their effectiveness is less well-established when 
the social dilemma takes the form of a CPR.  Some find that sanctions improve cooperation 
(Ostrom et al., 1992; Casari and Plott, 2003; van Soest and Vyrastekova, 2006), but others find 
the opposite result (Janssen et al., 2010; Cason and Gangadharan, 2013). In the same vein, the use 
of rewards to enforce cooperation in a CPR context has received less attention (exceptions 
include Vyrastekova and Van Soest, 2008; Stoop et al. 2013), even though its relevance to the 
real world is clear. In our design, we run all of our norm enforcement treatments in both CPR and 
VCM contexts to test this framing effect.  
The second originality of our paper is that we use a nonstandard subject-pool by enrolling a 
representative sample of new French police commissioners to complement participants from a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Punishment is typically directed at those individuals who violate the norm of cooperation given by the mean group 
contribution level. 
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standard subject-pool, mainly composed of engineering and business students. Indeed, our aim is 
to analyze whether police commissioners behave differently, in terms of institutional choices and 
norm enforcement. This population is perfectly suited for our study because police 
commissioners have self-selected in a ‘mission-oriented’ occupation in a particular destructive 
context of deterrence of crime and because their training and core function is in law enforcement 
(Besley and Ghatak, 2005). Additionally, some of our police commissioners had completed their 
training two years prior to our experiments, while others had just completed their training. This 
allows us to measure whether some experience with crime and enforcement affects behavior in 
our games with norm enforcement options.7  Our intuition is that police commissioners may have 
a stronger preference for sanctions because they self-select into an occupation that is exposed to 
destructive contexts and/or once enrolled they are explicitly trained to favor sanctions over 
rewards (Raganella and White, 2004; Wu et al., 2004).8  
Finally a third contribution of our experiment is to vary the way the enforcement institutions 
are implemented (either exogenously or endogenously) so that we can test whether, as 
government agents, police commissioners are more willing to utilize an institution when it results 
from a democratic choice. Specifically, in some treatments the enforcement institution is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 After conducting our experiments, we became aware of another experimental study of trust and norm enforcement 
conducted with applicants to the German police by G. Friebel and M. Kosfeld (2013). The two studies differ in 
several respects. First, their study focuses on how individuals self-select into an occupation based on their behavioral 
characteristics. Instead, we focus on comparing the use and efficacy of norm enforcement institutions in various 
environments given that subjects are police or non-police. We do not try to determine whether the behavior of police 
subjects is due to behavioral self-selection into the occupation or whether it results from the training in law 
enforcement they receive. Second, their subject-pool consists of students in the final year of the high school, who are 
may apply to the police. Instead, French police commissioners have higher education and are expected to manage 
large teams. Third, their design is based on a trust game with a third-party and individuals can use both rewards and 
sanctions in the same periods (in ours it is one or the other), and their study does not include endogenous institutions. 
Our studies are therefore complementary. 
8 Prendergast (2007) shows that among public employees, if social workers are more likely to be biased in favor of 
their clients, police officers are more likely biased against their clients, i.e. those who break the law. If behavior in 
law enforcement transposes to norm enforcement, commissioners may be more inclined to sanction than reward.  
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implemented by the computer, while in other treatments it results from a majority voting 
procedure. 	  
Our experiment consists of four treatments: Baseline, Reward, Sanction, and Vote. The 
Baseline treatment is a standard public good game without any enforcement institution. In the 
Sanction (Reward) treatment, a new stage is added after the contribution stage. After being 
informed of each other group member’s contribution, subjects can sanction (reward) group 
members at a personal cost. Finally, in the Vote treatment, a preliminary stage is added in which 
subjects have to vote for their preferred institution (reward or sanction), and the majority vote 
determines the institution that will be implemented.  
To preview our main results, we find that socially desired behavior (i.e., VCM cooperation 
or CPR non-extraction) is higher in the VCM compared to CPR context, the existence of norm 
enforcement increases socially desired behavior, and police subjects contribute more (extract 
less) than non-police subjects.  We also find that sanctions are used more frequently in the CPR 
context, and police subjects enforce norms more than non-police subjects. Though all subjects 
favor the reward institution when allowed to vote, we also find that police subjects with more 
experience in the police are more likely to vote for sanctions than other subjects. And finally, we 
find efficiency is highest with the reward institution and in the VCM context. While police 
subjects do not have higher payoffs than other subjects, their presence in mixed social dilemma 
groups raises efficiency (i.e., total group payoff) in that group. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the experimental 
design. Section 3 develops the predictions. Section 4 displays the results and section 5 discusses 
these results. 
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2. Experimental design 
Our design consists of four treatments for each subject: Baseline, Reward, Sanction, and Vote. 
The Baseline treatment allows us to compare behavior against results established in the literature. 
The Reward and Sanction treatments add the possibility of assigning costly reward or punishment 
points, respectively, as a way of enforcing norms of cooperation. Finally, the Vote treatment 
implements an endogenous enforcement institution by allowing subjects to vote as to whether the 
reward or sanction institution should be used. These treatments are administered in both VCM 
and CPR environments, which means we have a 4x2 mixed design (4 treatments within-subjects, 
and CPR or VCM as between-subjects factors). Subjects were matched using an anonymous 
partner matching protocol, such that groups were kept constant.  
 
2.1. Treatment parameters 
Baseline treatments:  In the Baseline VCM treatment, each of five homogenously endowed 
subjects allocate 20 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) to a private or a group account. Payoffs, 
as a function of the contribution of subject i, xi, are defined as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ! i
VCM = 20 ! xi + 0.3 x j
j=1
5
" 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1) 
In the Baseline CPR treatment, each of the five group members may each withdraw wi ∈ 
[0,20] from the group account. The payoff function of subject i is the following:9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
                      (2) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  In contrast with Fehr and Gächter (2000), our Baseline treatments provide subjects with feedback regarding each 
other group member’s contributions at the end of each period (thus keeping feedback constant across treatments).	  
	  
	  
8	  
It can be easily seen from eq. (1), and (2) that the two games are equivalent with 
 
Sanction treatments: The sanction institution is implemented exogenously. Each period 
now consists of two stages. The first stage is similar to the Baseline treatments. In the second 
stage, the subjects have the opportunity to assign costly sanction points, P, to each other group 
member. The payoff function, shown in the case of the CPR game, becomes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3) 
In eq. (3), cPji
j!i
" is the total cost of sanctions assigned by subjects j to subject i, with c 
indicating the per-unit cost of each point received (c=2 ECU).10 kPij
i! j
" is the total cost to subject i 
of the sanctions she imposes on all subjects j, with k=1 ECU being the cost to i of each sanction 
point assigned to any other player. A subject can assign a maximum of 10 sanction points to each 
other player. The total cost of points received cannot exceed the subject’s earnings from the first 
stage. 
Reward treatments: These treatments are similar to the Sanction treatments except that 
instead of punishing others, each subject can reward them by assigning reward points, R. Each 
reward point assigned costs k=1 ECU and each reward point received increases one’s payoff by 
c=2 ECU. The payoff function, again shown in the case of the CPR game, is:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In Fehr and Gächter (2000) and in most following studies on sanctions in VCM games, the cost ratio is 1:3. We 
chose a weaker 1:2 ratio because we wanted to hold this ratio constant for reward and sanction points. We feared that 
using a higher ratio for reward points would lead subjects to assign points to others not to enforce the cooperation 
norm, but to create reciprocity and increase payoffs. A lower ratio should, we thought, limit this motivation.  
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where cRji
j!i
" is the total gain of the rewards assigned by players j to player i and   kRij
i! j
" is the 
total cost to player i of all points assigned to others. A maximum of 10 points can be assigned to 
each other player and the total gain of points received cannot exceed the subject’s earnings from 
the first stage. 
Vote treatments: Here, the sanction or reward institution is implemented endogenously by 
adding a preliminary stage where subjects vote once for whether the Reward or Sanction 
institution should apply to the subsequent rounds in the treatment. Voting entails no monetary 
cost, the majority vote institution is implemented, and there is no feedback on individual votes of 
others.11 
2.2.  Experimental procedures 
The experiment was programmed using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions 
were conducted in the experimental laboratory of GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie 
Economique) in Lyon, France. The experiment consists of nine sessions in total (five CPR and 
four VCM sessions). Within a session, the Baseline (B) treatment was always played first. The 
Reward (R) and Sanction (S) treatments were always adjacent (but counterbalanced in order). 
The Vote (V) treatment was counterbalanced to be either before or after the Reward and Sanction 
treatments, which allows us to identify how inclinations for either rewards or sanctions were 
modified by the experience of these institutions. For groups where the Vote treatment occurred 
prior to the Reward and Sanction treatments, the two institutions were first described to each 
subject. Table 1 displays the details of the sessions, including treatment orderings administered.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Our procedure differs from that used in Sutter et al. (2010). In their design, subjects could vote between standard 
VCM, reward, and punishment by approval voting; voting was costly and voluntary, and voting was repeated until 
unanimity was achieved. 
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In a session, subjects played 10 periods in the Baseline and seven periods in each of the three 
other treatments.12 It was common knowledge that group member ID numbers were re-matched at 
the beginning of each period so that it was impossible to reciprocate the action of a specific group 
member in the previous period.13 The final earnings in these tasks were the sum of payoffs from 
all 31 periods.  
Each session involved 20 subjects, 8 to 10 of whom were police commissioners. Participants 
were not aware of the characteristics of the other participants. This means that, for instance, 
business and engineering students did not know that they were interacting with police subjects. 
Upon arrival, and after informed consent was obtained, subjects drew a ticket from an opaque bag 
assigning them to a specific terminal in the laboratory. The instructions were distributed for each 
part after completion of the previous part (see Appendix).14 After reading the instructions aloud, 
we verified each subject’s understanding of the instructions by means of a questionnaire and any 
questions were answered in private.15 Sessions lasted two hours on average. The average subject 
earnings were €26.19  (S.D.=4.39). Subjects were paid their earnings in private in a separate 
room. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Initially, we planned to run 10 periods in each of the four treatments. Unfortunately, and despite a pilot session 
with our usual subject-pool, we realized during the first session that some subjects were very slow to make decisions. 
Therefore, we decided to reduce the number of periods to seven after the Baseline treatment. We kept the same 
structure for the remaining sessions. For comparison, we chose to restrain our data analysis to periods 1 to 7 in the 
session where we ran 10 periods for all treatments.  
13 This was done to avoid counter-punishment (Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008) or counter-
rewarding (Stoop et al., 2011), as it has been shown that this possibility affects greatly the dynamics of groups.  
14 The instructions use the terms « contribution » in the VCM and « withdrawal » in the CPR. Sanctions (rewards) 
were labeled as “points that decrease (increase) others’ payoffs”. 
15	  At the beginning of the session we elicited risk attitudes using the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. We found no 
significant difference between subject pools (the mean numbers of safe choices out of 10 were 5.83 (1.78) and 5.82 
(1.71) for police and non-police subjects, respectively (Mann-Whitney test, two tailed, p=0.910). After risk 
elicitation, participants played a trust game (Berg et al., 1995) in both roles under the strategy method. We found no 
significant difference between subject pools in trusting behaviors (the mean amounts sent by player A to player B out 
of 10 were 2.69 (S.D.177) and 2.41 (SD 1.88) for police and non-police subjects, respectively (Mann-Whitney test, 
two tailed, p=0.448). Results from these two tasks were only given at the end of the session.  
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2.3. Subject pools 
In total, 180 subjects from two different pools participated in this experiment. The regular pool 
includes 93 subjects who were recruited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Most were 
undergraduate students from the selective local engineering and business schools; the minority 
are older participants, either employees on the campus or retirees.  
The other subject-pool consists of 87 individuals who had recently passed the very 
competitive national exam of police commissioners. We have two main types of subjects within 
this pool. The majority (73 of 87) were still studying in the French national school of police 
commissioners (Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police, or ENSP), the unique school for police 
commissioners in France located in the suburbs of Lyon. A minority (14 subjects) had finished 
training at ENSP two years prior and either had a permanent position as police commissioners or 
were in internships at the time of our experiments. These subjects participated in our experiment 
during a post-training return to ENSP, and participation was voluntary. The participants had to 
commit not to reveal the experimental protocol to other subjects before completion of all the 
sessions. 
Our police sample is representative of the population of French newly appointed police 
commissioners since each promotion includes 40 students who spend two years at ENSP 
(meaning that the participation rate for the students at ENSP is above 90%). On average, police 
subjects are older (mean: 32.82 ± 7.37 year old, min=23, max=48) than the subjects from the 
other pool (mean: 24.82 ± 9.22 year old, min=18, max=64).16 Additionally, police subjects are 
more typically male (79.66% compared to 44.26% males in the other subject pool).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Note that we have variation in age across both subject-pools, and we systematically control for age in the analysis. 
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3. Theoretical predictions 
3.1. Standard predictions 
We first derive predictions based on rational and selfish money maximizing agents, in which case 
the predictions are similar for police and non-police subjects. The equilibrium in a negative 
setting (CPR) is the same as in a positive one (VCM). Thus, we will merely describe predictions 
as a function of the enforcement institution and not the framing of the social dilemma.  
In the Baseline treatments, it can easily be seen from equations (1) and (2) that the dominant 
strategy Nash equilibrium is for all subjects to place all 20 ECU in their private account (xi = 0) 
contributing nothing to the public good or, alternatively, extracting all from the common resource 
(wi =20). In equilibrium, each subject earns 20 ECU and total group earnings are 100 ECU. In 
contrast, the strategy leading to the Pareto equilibrium is xi = 20 (or, wi = 0), which generates 
total group earnings of 150 ECU (or 30 ECU per subject). 
In both the Sanction and the Reward treatments, the only subgame perfect equilibrium, 
whether played once or finitely repeated, is also xi = 0 or wi=20 for all i and no use of sanctions 
or rewards because both are costly. In the Vote treatment, purely self-interested individuals 
should be indifferent between available institutions. Contribution or withdrawal behavior should 
not be affected by the choice of enforcement institution since sanctions/rewards are not credible.     
In sum, with money-maximizing self-interested play, the equilibrium prediction is the same 
across all enforcement institutions, games, and subject pools. Observed differences must 
therefore be attributed to behavioral factors resulting from a desire to enforce behavioral norms 
and/or the psychological impact of a positive vs. negatively framed decision environment.   
3.2. Behavioral predictions 
Our first set of conjectures concerns the norm of cooperation in the Baseline. Introducing other-
regarding preferences might take the form of advantageous inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 
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1999), social preferences for fairness and efficiency (Charness and Rabin, 2002), or imperfect 
conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Such theories 
predict that cooperation may result with sufficient numbers of cooperators in a group, though 
contributions may still decline over time. One may therefore conjecture that people with other-
regarding preferences should contribute positive amounts of their endowment in all treatments.  
Regarding subject pool effects, we predict that police commissioners will be more 
cooperative than others, given their stronger norm of civic cooperation and because they self-
selected into a public good oriented occupation where helping others is key motivation 
(Raganella and White, 2004). Our conjecture is that civil servants, whose job is to serve public 
interests, might be more cooperative than a standard subject-pool because those in mission-
oriented jobs are usually intrinsically motivated agents (Besley and Ghatak, 2005) who place 
more value on the output of public organizations (François, 2000).17  This prediction is also based 
on evidence from cross-cultural studies showing that cooperation in VCM games is lower in 
countries with weak norms of civic cooperation and weak laws (Herrmann et al., 2008).  
Regarding framing effects, based on the previous literature, we also expect to observe 
framing effects leading to higher cooperation in the VCM game than in the CPR game, despite 
similar monetary incentives (Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; Messer et al., 2007).  
We summarize our first set of conjectures as C1: 
C1: a) Police subjects will cooperate more than non-police subjects. b) Cooperation is more 
likely in the VCM than in the CPR game. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Investigations on the motivation for entering the police emphasize the importance of non-monetary dimensions, 
such as the willingness to help people and social status (Hageman, 1979; Moon and Hwang, 2004; Raganella and 
White, 2004; Tarng et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009). Social contribution is also ranked as the first determinant of job 
satisfaction by police officers (Carlan, 2007). 
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Our second set of conjectures is related to exogenous norm enforcement institutions. Sutter 
et al. (2010) demonstrate that the use of rewards in equilibrium is predicted by the Charness and 
Rabin model of social preferences only if there are enough subjects who value social welfare as 
strongly as their own payoff.  Punishment in equilibrium is predicted by the inequity aversion 
model only under very restrictive conditions. Based on previous evidence, we conjecture that a 
fraction of the subjects will sacrifice resources to sanction and/or reward and that rewards will be 
preferred to sanctions because they are more efficient (Sefton et al., 2007; Rand et al., 2009; 
Sutter et al., 2010). Because their occupation is mission-oriented (Besley and Ghatak, 2005) and 
also because it requires expertise in law enforcement to fight deviant behavior (Wu et al., 2009), 
we conjecture that police subjects will be willing to bear a disproportionate burden of the 
enforcement costs in punishing norm violators. Finally, regarding framing effects, since less 
cooperation might be observed in the CPR context, we expect to observe relatively more 
sanctions in the CPR. In addition, we also expect more sanctions in the CPR because norm 
violation involves active destruction of the resource, which may trigger more negative emotions.  
We summarize our second set of conjectures as C2:  
 
C2: a) Police subjects will enforce norms more than non-police, particularly with sanctions and 
in the CPR context. b) More sanctions (less rewards) will be assigned in the CPR context.   
 
Our last set of conjectures is related to the endogenous norm enforcement institutions. 
Because police fight crime with threats and sanctions, we conjecture that police commissioners 
are more inclined to vote in favor of sanctions than the other subjects. We also predict that, as 
government agents, they use the institution more intensely when it results from a democratic 
vote. Finally, endogenously selected institutions are expected to better sustain cooperation than 
exogenously implemented institutions (see Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et 
al., 2010).  
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We summarize our third set of conjectures as C3:  
C3: a) Police subjects will vote more in favor of the sanction institution than others. b) Subjects, 
especially police subjects, will more intensively use enforcement when the institution results from 
a democratic vote. c) Endogenous institutions will increase cooperation relative to exogenously 
implemented institutions. 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Cooperation 
In what follows, ‘contribution’ refers to the amount not extracted from the group account in the 
CPR game, or the amount placed in the group account in the VCM game. Figures 1 and 2 display 
mean contributions over time per treatment in the VCM and CPR games, respectively.  
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
Both figures exhibit the standard decay of contributions over time in the Baseline treatments. 
Focusing first on the exogenous enforcement institutions, we find that mean contributions are 
significantly higher in the Sanction treatments compared to Baseline treatments (Mann-Whitney 
test, p=0.0004 and p=0.0247 in the VCM and the CPR games, respectively). Mean contributions 
are also higher in the Reward treatments compared to Baseline treatments (p=0.0288 and 0.0514). 
Sanctions tend to outperform Rewards, but the difference is not significant (p=0.2913 and 
0.2035). These findings are consistent with previous literature. Figures 1 and 2 also indicate that 
when a vote resulted in using the Sanction institution, cooperation increases dramatically 
compared to Baseline (p=0.007 and 0.001, in the VCM and CPR games, respectively). 
Endogenous sanctions also increase contributions compared to exogenous sanctions in the VCM 
game (p=0.065), but not in the CPR game (p=0.221). Compared to Baseline, the increase in 
contributions from endogenous rewards is not statistically significant (p=0.148 and 0.484 in the 
VCM and the CPR games, respectively), nor is the increase seen with exogenous rewards 
institutions (p=0.511 and 0.526).  Regarding framing effects, our data show that contributions are 
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higher in VCM compared to CPR, but the differences are not statistically significant. Baseline 
mean contributions, in terms of ECUs, are 6.49 in VCM and 5.46 in the CPR game (Mann 
Whitney, p=0.324). In the Sanction treatment they are 13.10 (VCM) compared to 10.91 (CPR) 
(p=0.347), while in the Reward treatment they are 10.94 (VCM) and 8.32 (CPR) (p=0.156).  
We turn next to comparisons across subject-pools. Figure 3 displays average contribution 
levels for police and non-police subjects, by treatment in the VCM and the CPR games.  
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
As shown in Figure 3, in all treatments, police subjects cooperate more on average than the 
others but the differences are not significant. The lack of a statistically significant subject pool 
effect is true in all treatments examined (Mann-Whitney, p>0.10 in all cases), except for the 
Vote-Sanction treatment, where police subjects contribute significantly more than non-police 
(18.42 vs 17.03 ECU, p=0.088).	  The fact that most non-parametric tests fail to identify significant 
effects here is not that surprising since our subject-pools differ on several characteristics not 
controlled for in the non-parametric data analysis. We therefore appeal to parametric data 
analysis to further investigate differences across subject pools. 
Table 2 reports three random-effects Tobit regressions analyzing the determinants of the 
contribution decision. Random effects control for the lack of independence of the contributions of 
a given subject across decision rounds and Tobit models are justified by the fact that 
contributions are censured both at 0 and 20 ECU. We pool the data from all treatments and we 
standardize contributions of individual i in period t as the dependent variable by defining 
contributions in the CPR game as the amount (20-wit) that is not withdrawn from the common 
resource. In models (1) to (3) of Table 2, independent variables include a dummy variable for the 
VCM game and treatment dummies, with the Baseline omitted as the reference treatment. We 
also include controls for period (1-7) and a dummy for the last period to control for end-game 
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effects. Model (2) adds a dummy for police subjects (Police) and other demographic controls. 
Model (3) adds a dummy for police commissioners being in an active position after training 
(Police in activity). In models (2) and (3), we also control for trust and political orientation.18 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 shows that cooperation is higher when norm enforcement is possible, even more so 
under the Sanction treatments than under the Reward treatments relative to the Baseline. The 
coefficient of the Sanction treatment is significantly higher than the coefficient of the Reward 
treatment. We also find that endogenous sanctions lead to higher contributions than exogenous 
sanctions. In contrast, the coefficient of the Vote Reward treatment is not different than the 
coefficient of the Reward treatment. This could result from the fact that a majority vote in favor 
of sanctions is a clearer signal against free-riders than a vote in favor of rewards. These estimated 
effects are robust across models. Table 2 also indicates that, once we control for other variables, 
contributions are significantly higher in the VCM than in the CPR game, which supports C1b.  
Table 2 also shows that the police-subjects contribute significantly more than the non-police 
subjects.19 This finding supports conjecture C1a. Some experience in police work does not make 
any significant difference. In an additional estimate (not reported here but available upon 
request), we also tested whether the framing effect was different across subject pools by 
including an interaction term “police subject*VCM”. This variable is not statistically significant.  
These findings are summarized in Result 1. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Trust” corresponds to the amount sent by player A to player B in the trust game. The “political orientation” 
variable corresponds to the response to the following question in the post-experimental questionnaire: «In politics 
one usually speaks of right and left. Where do you situate yourself on a scale from 1 on the left to 10 on the right? ». 
19 Gächter et al. (2004) also report that non-students contribute more than students but their results are from a one-
shot VCM environment as opposed to our finding in a multi-period environment.  In what follows, our additional 
results regarding norm enforcement and preference for punishments over rewards helps us attribute the subject pool 
effects we report to the special attributes of police officers, as opposed to non-students in general. 
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Result 1. a) Cooperation is higher when norm enforcement is possible. b) Sanctions are more 
effective than rewards. c) Endogenous sanctions lead to higher contributions than exogenous 
sanctions. d) contributions are significantly higher in the VCM than in the CPR game. e) Police 
subjects contribute significantly more than non-police subjects. 
 
 
4.2.  Sanctions and Rewards  
Figures 4 and 5 show the evolution of mean enforcement points assigned across periods in the 
VCM and CPR contexts, respectively. These figures show that subjects are willing to use both 
rewards and sanctions to enforce norms, even at personal cost. The use of the enforcement 
institutions declines over time in both games. It may be the case that enforcement is less 
necessary once it has been previously used within a group. A notable exception is that 
endogenous sanctions tend to increase in last 1-2 periods. These figures also show that there is no 
systematic tendency to more intensively use sanctions relative to rewards, except when the 
institution is endogenous. In this case, subjects are more willing to reward than punish in the 
VCM game (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.093), but not in the CPR game (p= 0.513).  
[Insert Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
Figure 6 suggests that police subjects enforce norms more intensively than non-police 
subjects in all treatments, and this difference seems larger in the CPR game. It also shows that the 
mean number of both sanction and reward points is lower in the VCM than in the CPR game.  
 [Insert Figure 6 about here] 
Table 3 analyzes the determinants of norm enforcement by means of random-effects Tobit 
models to control for censored observations. We removed from this analysis the Baseline 
treatment. The dependent variable is the number of assigned points (both punishment and reward 
points) by each player i to another player j. In model (1) of Table 3, we include controls for the 
VCM game and for each enforcement institution (Reward treatment is the reference category). 
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Controls are included for points received in the previous period, period of the game, a dummy for 
last period, dummies for police-subjects, and other demographics. Model (2) includes several 
interaction variables to check whether police subjects’ decisions differ across treatments.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 shows that subjects assign significantly less punishment points than rewards and that 
the number of points assigned declines over time. It indicates that police subjects are more likely 
to engage in norm enforcement than the other subjects. Model (2) shows that police subjects are 
more willing to enforce norms using sanctions. Police subjects also use rewards significantly 
more as long as the reward institution is endogenously implemented (i.e., by vote).   
Tables 4 and 5 analyze the determinants of the number of punishment and reward points a 
subject assigns to each other group member by estimating random-effects Tobit models. Model 
(1) includes controls for the VCM game, whether the enforcement institution was endogenous or 
exogenous, points received in the previous period, and other variables mentioned before. 
Compared to model (1), model (2) also includes a variable to measure the positive deviation of 
the contribution of the subject being assigned points from the average of the rest of the group 
(Pos Dev Avg), as well as a variable to measure the absolute value of a negative deviation from 
the group average (|Neg Dev| Avg). Note that one’s own contribution is included in the group 
average contribution levels being considered in Pos Dev Avg and |Neg Dev| Avg, and so these 
models estimate effects while controlling for the subject’s contribution level. Avg Contr Others 
measures the effect of others’ contributions (excluding the target’s contribution) on one’s own 
decision to assign points. In addition, we control for trust and political orientation. The last two 
models are similar to (2) but estimate the model separately for exogenous (model (3)) versus 
endogenous (model (4)) enforcement institutions.  
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
	  
	  
20	  
Table 4 shows that subjects are significantly more willing to sanction group members in the 
CPR than in the VCM game when the sanction institution is implemented exogenously (model 
(3)). Subjects contributing more (less) than the group average are uniformly less (more) 
sanctioned, and subjects assign fewer points the higher others in one’s group contributed.  There 
is also evidence of blind negative reciprocity and of a declining time trend for norm enforcement 
via sanctions. Police subjects are more willing to sanction than non-police subjects. The 
magnitude of this effect is particularly large for newly minted commissioners with no job 
experience (model (4)). Two-stage Heckit estimations (not reported here but available upon 
request) show that the difference between subject-pools is due to the extensive margin decision to 
punish or not, and not to the intensive margin decision to assign more or less punishment points.  
Table 5 show that an endogenous reward institution marginally increases the likelihood of 
rewarding group members (model (2)). Subjects assign more reward points to those contributing 
more than the group average, and more reward points in general when others contribute more. 
There is also evidence of blind positive reciprocity and a negative time trend. Police 
commissioners assign more reward points than other subjects but only when the reward 
institution results from a majority vote (models (3) and (4)).  
To sum up, Tables 3 to 5 reveal three results of particular interest. First, subjects are 
significantly less willing to punish than reward others and they are less inclined to use sanctions 
in the VCM than in the CPR game, independent of the lower contribution levels in the CPR 
context. This may reflect the fact that the negative frame of the CPR context is more likely to 
generate negative emotions and induce the use of punishment. Secondly, police subjects, 
especially those in activity, enforce norms with punishment significantly more than non-police 
subjects. This supports our conjecture C2a. There is also some evidence that novice police 
commissioners enforce norms with rewards significantly more than others. We attribute these 
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police subject results to the fact that police work is one where law enforcement is almost entirely 
by use of sanctions, and experience with punishment and crime in their occupation may train 
their preferences towards punishment. Third, police commissioners tend to use the institutional 
norm enforcement more than the non-police subjects when the institution results from a majority 
vote. This police-specific “democracy effect” might result from the civic values in the occupation 
of police officers. For the whole sample, an enforcement institution resulting from a majority 
vote leads to higher norm enforcement, but only when the norm enforcement institution is 
reward. This is also a novel result in the literature.  
Our main findings regarding norm enforcement are summarized in Result 2.  
Result 2. a) Police subjects enforce norms significantly more than non-police, especially with 
sanctions. b) Police enforce norms significantly more when the enforcement institution results 
from a majority vote, while for the whole subject pool, this democracy effect is only observed for 
the reward institution. c) More sanctions are used under the CPR than under the VCM. 
 
4.3. Voting on norm enforcement Institutions 
Table 6 displays the distribution of votes for the reward and sanction institutions for each pool of 
subjects in the VCM and CPR games.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Table 6 indicates that subjects are much more likely to choose the Reward over the Sanction 
institution. The proportion preferring rewards is significantly higher than the proportion 
preferring sanctions in both VCM and CPR games (binomial tests; p<0.01 for both), and there is 
no difference between the two games (Χ 2 test, p = 0.941). Although the majority of police 
subjects still voted for Rewards, they were more inclined to vote for Sanctions compared to non-
police (32% vs. 24% for CPR and 35.1% vs. 20.9% for VCM).  A Χ 2-test indicates that the 
difference is however not statistically significant (p=	   0.156 and p=0.373 for VCM and CPR, 
respectively).  
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Table 7 investigates the individual determinants of the vote in favor of the sanction 
institution by estimating Probit models. In model (1), the independent variables include a dummy 
variable for the VCM game and a control indicating whether the vote occurs after the subjects 
have experienced both enforcement institutions.  Model (2) adds a dummy variable to account for 
whether the subject is a police commissioner and demographic controls. The last model also 
controls for whether the police subject already has some experience (i.e., “in activity”).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Supporting conjecture C3a, Table 7 confirms that police subjects exhibit a higher preference 
for sanctions compared to others. This preference is significant only for commissioners with 
more experience with the police, suggesting that a longer exposure to crime and punishment 
reinforces confidence in sanctions. In parallel, a longer experience to possible free riding and 
with each institution increases the preference for sanctions as shown by the significant coefficient 
associated to the variable “vote with experience of the game”. Sanctions become more appealing 
after observing the decay of cooperation and the higher impact of sanctions relative to rewards. 
This leads to our next result regarding the police subjects: 
Result 3. Police subjects are more likely to vote for the sanction institution compared to others. 
This effect is driven by those with work experience as police commissioners. 
 
4.4. Efficiency 
Lastly, we investigate the efficiency, as measured by the sum of final payoffs. Table 8 reports the 
first-stage and final payoffs in all treatments and games. Pooling the data from the VCM and 
CPR games, the first column indicates that the mean payoffs after the contribution stage (i.e., 
before enforcement points are subtracted or added) rank as follows: 22.96 ECU in the Baseline, 
24.13 in Vote Reward, 24.74 in Reward, 25.94 in Sanction, and 28.91 in Vote Sanction. 
However, mainly due to the destruction of resources by sanctions, the final payoff ranking 
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differs: 18.84 ECU in Sanction, 22.96 in Baseline, 24.10 Vote Sanction, 26.65 in Vote Reward, 
and 26.88 in Reward. Table 8 also indicates that in all treatments the mean first-stage and final 
payoffs are higher in the VCM than in the CPR game, with the highest efficiency achieved when 
using rewards in both games and the highest efficiency losses associated with the sanction 
enforcement institution in the CPR game. 
Finally, Table 9 reports the estimations of random-effects Generalized Least Squared 
models, in which the dependent variable is either the first-stage payoff (models (1) and (2)), or 
the final payoff (models (3) and (4)). Independent variables are those used in previous 
regressions, with the addition in models (2) and (4) of a variable indicating the number of police 
subjects in the group.  
[Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here] 
Both models (1) and (2) show significant treatment coefficients, indicating that introducing a 
norm enforcement institution increases first-stage payoffs by encouraging cooperation. The 
coefficients are particularly high in the Vote Sanction treatments. Models (3) and (4) show that 
the Reward institution, whether implemented by vote or exogenously, increases efficiency. In 
contrast, the Sanction institution decreases efficiency, though the magnitude of the loss is small 
when sanctions are implemented by vote. Interestingly, those in groups with more police subjects 
make higher payoffs because police subjects tend to cooperate more and bear a higher share of 
the enforcement costs. This leads to our final result: 
Result 4. a) Sanctions increase cooperation the most, but rewards increase overall efficiency. b) 
Efficiency is systematically higher in the VCM than in the CPR game. c) Police subjects do not 
earn more than the other subjects, but their presence in a group increases efficiency in the group.  
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5. Discussion  
In this study, we examined norm enforcement using either carrots or sticks in two distinct 
social dilemmas (VCM and CPR). A field-experiment element in our design was the use of a 
sample of French police commissioners along with a standard subject pool. We have three main 
sets of findings.  
First, experience with a “destructive” social dilemma context, either in the experiment 
(i.e., the CPR context versus VCM) or in real life through longer exposure to crime in police 
work, leads to a stronger use of sanctions. We also find that police subjects with some work 
experience show more preference for sanctions compared to non-police.  These results contribute 
to our understanding of how police officers behave in social dilemmas. More sanctions are used 
in the CPR game than in the VCM game, even after controlling for lower contributions in the 
CPR context. This is possibly because a negative frame may triggers more negative emotions 
than a positive frame for the social dilemma.  Rewards are not used any more frequently in the 
VCM than in the CPR game and they become less effective than sanctions over time in both 
games. Our results are also important because they lend some support to the external validity of 
laboratory games: despite our artificial environment, norm enforcement behavior in the 
laboratory is correlated with some experience in norm enforcement in real settings such as law 
enforcement. Finally, a longer exposure to free riding over time in the experimental game also 
leads subjects to favor sanctions over rewards for norm enforcement.  
Secondly, we show that individuals in a mission-oriented occupation responsible for norm 
enforcement, like police commissioners, are both more cooperative in social dilemmas and they 
bear more of the costs of the norm enforcement. This is especially true when the enforcement 
institution uses punishment. This translates into higher earnings for groups populated with more 
police subjects.  
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 Thirdly, when the choice of the institution depends on voting, a large majority of 
individuals prefer Rewards over Sanctions in both the CPR and VCM games. This result extends 
that of Sutter et al. (2010) to a wider set of conditions. This preference may be due to a 
willingness to avoid the loss of efficiency associated with sanctions and/or the perspective of 
mutual benefits through positive reciprocity within groups. Interestingly, individuals are more 
likely to enforce norms, in general, when the majority has selected the enforcement institution 
compared to when it is imposed. This effect is stronger in police commissioners who are 
particularly sensitive to the democratic implementation of both types of enforcement institutions, 
possibly because they are more reactive to civic virtues and to intrinsic motivation in general. 
Finally, we find that the endogenous sanction institution leads to higher contributions compared 
to the corresponding exogenously imposed institution.  
We acknowledge a number of limitations to our study. It would be desirable to recruit more 
experienced police commissioners. Indeed, this would allow us to better identify whether the 
police-subject effect is due to intrinsic motivation and self-selection, or whether it is due to the 
role of experience in law enforcement. Moreover, the low number of periods in our experiment 
penalizes sanction efficiency because the benefits of sanctions take more time to develop than the 
benefits of rewards. Despite these limitations, we believe that it is important to expose norm 
enforcement mechanisms to a large variety of environmental and institutional conditions so as to 
evaluate their robustness and derive policy implications on institutional design. 
	  
	  
26	  
 
References 
Anderson, C.M., Putterman, L. (2006). Do Non-Strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? 
The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Games and Economic 
Behavior 54 (1), 1-24. 
Andreoni, J. (1988). Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments. 
Journal of Public Economics 37, 291-304. 
Andreoni, J. (1995). Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effects of positive and negative framing 
on cooperation in experiments. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(1), 1–21. 
Andreoni, J., Harbaugh, W., Vesterlund, L. (2003). The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards, 
Punishments and Cooperation. American Economic Review, 93(3), 893-902.  
Barr A. (2001). Social Dilemmas and Shame-based Sanctions: Experimental results from rural 
Zimbabwe. Working Paper 2001-11, Centre for the Study of African Economies University of 
Oxford. 
Becker, G.S. (1968), « Crime and Punishment: An Economie Approach », Journal of Political 
Economy, 76 : 169-217. 
Benoit, J.P., Dubra, J. (2004). Why do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops? International Economic 
Review, 45(3), 787-809. 
Bernhard, H., Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. (2006). Group affiliation and altruistic norm 
enforcement. American Economic Review 96(2), 217–221. 
Besley, T., Ghatak, M. (2005). Competition and incentives with motivated agents. American 
Economic Review 95(3), 616-636. 
Bochet, O., Page, T., Putterman, L. (2006). Communication and Punishment in Voluntary 
Contribution Experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 60 (1), 11-26. 
Carlan, P.E. (2007). The Search for Job Satisfaction: A Survey of Alabama Policing. American 
Journal of Criminal Justice 32(3),74-86. 
Carpenter, J.P. (2007). Punishing Free Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and 
the Provision of Public Goods. Games and Economic Behavior 60 (1), 31-51. 
Cason, T.N., Gangadharan, L. (2013). Swords without covenants do not lead to self-governance. 
Krannert School of Management, Purdue University. 
Charness, G., Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple test. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 117, 817–869. 
Cox, J.C., Friedman, D., Sadiraj, V. (2008). Revealed Altruism. Econometrica 76, 31-69. 
Cox, J.C., Ostrom, E., Sadiraj, V., Walker, J.M. (2013). Provision versus appropriation in 
symmetric and asymmetric social dilemmas. Southern Economic Journal 79(3), 496-512. 
Cox, J.C., Servátka M., Vadovič, R. (2013). Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games : Reciprocal 
Responses to Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission. Working Paper Georgia State 
University. 
Denant-Boemont, L., Masclet, D., Noussair, C. (2007). Punishment, counterpunishment and 
sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment. Economic Theory 31 (1), 145-167. 
Dickinson, D.L. (2001). The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Team Motivation. Experimental 
Economics 4(1), 107-124. 
	  
	  
27	  
Dugar S. (2013) Non-Monetary Incentives and Opportunistic Behavior: Evidence from a 
Laboratory Public Good Game. Economic Inquiry, 51 (2), 1374-1388.  
Fehr, E., Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment. American Economic Review 90(4), 
980-994. 
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. (1999). A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 114, 817–868. 
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments. 
Experimental Economics 10 (2), 171-178. 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., Fehr, E. (2001). Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence 
from a Public Goods Experiment. Economics Letters 71 (3), 397-404. 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. (2010). Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free 
Riding in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review 100(1): 541-56. 
Forsythe R., Horowitz, J.L., Savin, N.E., Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining games. 
Games and Economic Behavior 6, 347-369. 
François, P. (2000). ‘Public service motivation’ as an argument for government provision. 
Journal of Public Economics 78(3), 275-299. 
Friebel G. and M. Kosfeld (2013). “Sorting of Motivated Agents : Evidence from Applicants to 
the German Police”, IZA Workshop on Behavioral Organizational Economics June 17-18th, 
Bonn. 
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B. (2011). The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: 
Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia. European Economic Review, 55, 193-
210. 
Gächter, S., Herrmann, B, Thöni, C. (2004). Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic 
background: Survey and experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 55, 505-531. 
Gächter, M., Savage, D., Torgler, B. (2009). The Relationship between Stress and Social Capital 
among Police Officers, Working Paper 250, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland 
University of Technology. 
Greiner, B. (2004). An Online Recruiting System for Economic Experiments. In: Kurt Kremer, 
Volker Macho (Eds.). Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG Bericht 63,  
Göttingen: Ges. für Wiss. Datenverarbeitung, 79-93.  
Gürerk, O., Irlenbusch, B., Rockenbach, B. (2006). The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning 
Institutions. Science 312, 108-111. 
Hageman, M.J.C. (1979). Who joins the force for what reasons: An argument for ‘the new breed’. 
Journal of Police Science and Administration, 7(2), 206-210. 
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R. (2001). In 
search of Homo Oeconomicus: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. American 
Economic Review 91(2), 73-78. 
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319, 
1362-1367. 
Holt, C.A, Laury, S.K.  (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic Review 
92(5), 1644-1655.   
	  
	  
28	  
Isaac, R.M., Walker, J.M., Thomas, S.H. (1984). Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An 
Experimental Examination of Possible Explanation. Public Choice 43 (2), 113-149. 
Janssen, M., Holahan, R., Lee,  A., Ostrom, E. (2010). Lab Experiments for the Study of  Social-
Ecological Systems. Science, 30 April, 328, 613-617.  
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk. 
Econometrica 47 (2), 263–291. 
Kosfeld, M., Okada, A., Riedl, A. (2009). Institution Formation in Public Goods Games. 
American Economic Review 99 (4), 1335-1355. 
Lazear E. (1995). Personnel economics. Cambridge Mass MIT Press 
Ledyard, J. (1995). Public Goods: a Survey of Experimental Research. In Kagel, J., Roth, A.E. 
(Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 111-
194. 
Masclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., Villeval, M.C. (2003). Monetary and Non-Monetary 
Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. American Economic Review 93(1), 
366-380. 
Messer, K.D., Zarghamee, H., Kaiser, H.M., Schultze, W.D. (2007). New hope for the voluntary 
contributions mechanism: The effects of context. Journal of Public Economics 91, 1783-1799. 
Miguel, E. and Gugerty, M.K. (2005). Ethnic diversity, social sanctions and public goods in 
Kenya. Journal of Public Economics 89, 2325–2368. 
Moon B., Hwang, E. (2004). The reasons for choosing a career in policing among South Korean 
police cadets. Journal of Criminal Justice 32, 223-229. 
Nikiforakis, N. (2008). Punishment and counter-punishment in public-good games: Can we really 
govern ourselves? Journal of Public Economics 92, 91–112. 
Nikoforakis, N., Normann, H. T., (2008). A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in 
Public-Good Experiment. Experimental Economics 11,.358-369. 
Noussair, C., van Soest, D. and Stoop, J. (2011). Punishment, reward, and cooperation in a 
framed field experiment. Munich Personal RePEc Archive. 
Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14 (3), 137-158. 
Park, E.S. (2000). Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing 
effects on free-riding. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 43, 405-421. 
Prediger, S. (2011). How does income inequality affect cooperation and punishment in public 
good settings? Philipps-Univerisität Marburg. 
Prendergast, C. (2007). The motivation and bias of bureaucrats. American Economic Review, 
97(1), 180-196. 
Putterman L., Tyran, J.R., Kamei, K. (2011). Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction 
Schemes. Journal of Public Economics 95(9-10), 1213-1222. 
Raganella, A.J., White, M.D. (2004). Race, gender, and motivation for becoming a police officer 
Implications for building a representative police department. Journal of Criminal Justice 32, 
501-513. 
Rand D.G., Dreber A., Ellingsen T., Fudenberg D., Nowak M.A. (2009) Positive interactions 
promote public cooperation. Science 325 (4), 1272-1275. 
	  
	  
29	  
Sefton, M., Shupp, R., Walker J. (2007). The Effects of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of 
Public Goods. Economic Inquiry 45(4), 671-690. 
Skolnick, J. H., Fyfe, J. D. (1995). Community-Oriented Policing Would Prevent Police 
Brutality. In Winters, P. A. (Ed.) Policing the Police. San Diego: Greenhaven Press. 45–55. 
Stoop, J.T.R., van Soest, D.P., Vyrastekova, J. (2013). A tale of two carrots: the effectiveness of 
multiple reward stages in a common pool resource game. In List, J.A., Price, M.K. (Eds.), 
Handbook of Experimental Economics and the Environment. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 291-
318. 
Sutter, M., Haigner, S., Kocher, M. (2010). Choosing the carrot or the stick? Endogenous 
institutional choice in social dilemma situations. Review of Economic Studies 77, 1540-1566. 
Tarng, M., Hsieh, C., Deng, T. (2001). Personal background and reasons for choosing a career in 
policing: An empirical study of police students in Taiwan. Journal of Criminal Justice, 29, 45- 
56. 
Tyran, J.R., Feld, L.P. (2006). Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-deterrent. 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108 (1), 135-156. 
Van Soest, D. Vyrastekova, J. (2006). Peer enforcement in CPR experiments: the relative 
effectiveness of sanctions and transfer rewards, and the role of behavioural types. In List, J. 
(Ed.) Using Experimental Methods in Environmental and Resource Economics. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Visser, M., Burns, J. (2006). Bridging the Great Divide in South Africa: Inequality and 
Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods. Göteborg University Working Paper 219. 
Vyrastekova, J. Van Soest, D. (2008). On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining 
cooperation. Experimental Economics 11, 53-65. 
Walker, J.M, Halloran, M. (2004). Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in 
One Shot Settings. Experimental Economics 7, 235-247.  
Wu Y., Sun, I.Y, Cretacci, M.A. (2009). A study of Chinese cadets’ motivation to become police 
officers. International Journal of Police Science and Management 11(3), 377-392. 
Yamagishi, T. (1986). The Provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 51(1), 110-116. 
	  
	  
30	  
 
Table 1. 
Description 
of sessions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: B: Baseline treatment; R: Reward treatment; S: Sanction treatment; V: Vote treatment. CPR: Common Pool 
Resources; VCM: Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Session Sequence Game Number of subjects 
1 BRSV CPR 20 
2 BRSV VCM 20 
3 BSRV CPR 20 
4 BSRV CPR 20 
5 BVRS CPR 20 
6 BVSR CPR 20 
7 BSRV VCM 20 
8 BVRS VCM 20 
9 BVSR VCM 20 
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     Table 2. Determinants of contribution levels  
 
Dependent variable: Random-effects Tobit models 
Contribution (1) (2) (3) 
Sanction treatment 12.31*** 12.31*** 12.32*** 
 (0.602) (0.602) (0.602) 
Reward treatment  6.101*** 6.103*** 6.104*** 
 (0.590) (0.590) (0.590) 
Vote Sanction treatment 29.64*** 29.63*** 29.63*** 
 (1.516) (1.516) (1.515) 
Vote Reward treatment 4.379*** 4.383*** 4.383*** 
 (0.639) (0.639) (0.639) 
VCM game 5.465*** 5.634*** 5.207** 
 (2.114) (2.088) (2.136) 
Period -1.369*** -1.368*** -1.368*** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Last period -1.458** -1.456** -1.456** 
 (0.697) (0.697) (0.697) 
Police ---- 4.270* 4.837** 
   (2.389) (2.466) 
Police in activity ---- ---- -3.726 
    (4.148) 
Age ---- -0.0815 -0.0763 
  (0.130) (0.129) 
Male ---- 0.689 0.703 
  (2.243) (2.238) 
Trust  0.649 0.631 
  (0.571) (0.570) 
Political orientation  0.285 0.251 
  (0.496) (0.496) 
Constant 5.903*** 2.435 2.725 
  (1.531) (4.651) (4.651) 
N 
Left-cens. obs. 
Right cens. obs. 
Log-likelihood 
5580 
1903 
1643 
-10538.99 
5580 
1903 
1643 
-10535.99 
5580 
1903 
1643 
-10535.59 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively for the 2-tailed test. The 5580 observations correspond to the 180 subjects observed in 31 periods of 
game.	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        Table 3. Determinants of sanction or reward decisions  
Dependent variable                    Random-Effects Tobit models 
Number of  
reward or sanction points (1) (2) 
Sanction treatment -0.385*** -0.610*** 
	   (0.116) (0.168) 
Vote Sanction treatment -0.830*** -1.384*** 
	   (0.245) (0.434) 
Vote Reward treatment -0.0397 -0.262 
	   (0.121) (0.172) 
VCM game -0.372 -0.366 
	   (0.402) (0.402) 
Period -0.310*** -0.310*** 
	   (0.0359) (0.0359) 
Last period -0.0653 -0.0653 
	   (0.177) (0.176) 
Police 0.944** 	  	  
  (0.462) 	  	  
Police in activity 0.253 0.240 
  (0.777) (0.777) 
Police*Sanction treatment  1.075** 
   (0.482) 
Police*Reward treatment  0.646 
	  	    (0.478) 
Police*VoteSanction treatment   1.511** 
	  	    (0.677) 
 1.078** 
Police*VoteReward treatment 
 (0.488) 
Points received in previous period 0.290***   0.290*** 
  (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Trust  0.0949 0.0948 
  (0.107) (0.107) 
Political orientation -0.0110 -0.0117 
  (0.0933) (0.0932) 
Age  0.0294 0.0293 
	   (0.0243) (0.0243) 
Male -0.0168 -0.0225 
	   (0.421) (0.420) 
-3.996*** -3.831*** 
Constant 
(0.893) (0.895) 
N 12960 12960 
Left censored obs. 9954 9954 
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Log-likelihood -11487.28 -11484.12 
 
Table 4. Determinants of sanction decisions  
Dependent variable                       Random-Effects Tobit models 
Number of  Exo. Endo. 
sanction points  
Exogenous and endogenous 
institution institution institution 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
0.150 0.372 - - Vote Sanction treatment 
(0.331) (0.327)   
VCM game -0.443 -1.548*** -1.809*** 1.345 
 (0.645) (0.600) (0.605) (2.069) 
Received points in t-1 0.138*** 0.094*** 0.067** 0.252*** 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.096) 
Pos Dev Avg --- -0.116*** -0.109*** -0.639** 
  (0.031) (0.030) (0.269) 
|Neg Dev| Avg --- 0.499*** 0.493*** 0.474*** 
  (0.022) (0.026) (0.060) 
Avg Contr Others --- -0.197*** -0.208*** -0.383 
  (0.029) (0.031) (0.271) 
Period -0.357*** -0.331*** -0.298*** -0.309 
 (0.074) (0.065) (0.066) (0.263) 
Last period 1.044*** 0.287 0.172 1.241 
 (0.343) (0.308) (0.314) (1.227) 
-0.538 -0.031 -0.144 6.266** Police 
(0.736) (0.680) (0.681) (2.466) 
Police  in activity 2.519** 1.882* 1.814* 2.219 
  (1.203) (1.100) (1.099) (2.590) 
Age  0.143*** 0.0911*** 0.0941*** -0.0146 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.139) 
Male 0.352 0.214 0.482 -4.419** 
 (0.665) (0.621) (0.623) (2.170) 
Trust --- 0.099 0.049 -0.409 
  (0.155) (0.156) (0.421) 
Political orientation --- -0.033 -0.063 0.176 
  (0.137) (0.138) (0.366) 
-8.245*** -4.159*** -3.630*** -3.713 Constant 
 (1.212) (1.413) (1.409) (6.736) 
N 5280 5280 4320 960 
Left censored obs. 4364 4364 3506 858 
Log-likelihood -3800.05 -3410.88 -2943.10 -426.05 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively for the 2-tailed test.  The 4320 observations correspond to the decisions of the 180 subjects observed in 
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6 periods of game (one variable is lagged) for each of their other 4 group members. The 960 observations correspond 
to 40 subjects’ decisions for each of their 4 group members in 6 periods in groups who voted for sanction. 
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Table 5. Determinants of reward decisions  
Dependent variable:                                     Random-Effects Tobit models 
Number of  Exo Endo 
reward points  
Exogenous and endogenous 
institution institution institution 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vote Reward treatment 0.041 0.181* - - 
 (0.099) (0.093)   
VCM game -0.224 0.232 0.114 -0.432 
 (0.465) (0.438) (0.494) (0.525) 
Received points in t-1 0.193*** 0.150*** 0.133*** 0.113*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) 
Pos Dev Avg ---- 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.162*** 
 	   (0.013) (0.019) (0.018) 
|Neg Dev| Avg ---- -0.339*** -0.334*** -0.328*** 
 	   (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) 
Avg Contr Others ---- 0.199*** 0.130*** 0.182*** 
 	   (0.015) (0.023) (0.024) 
Period -0.341*** -0.244*** -0.344*** -0.281*** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.048) (0.049) 
Last period -0.555*** -0.222 -0.443* 0.035 
 (0.185) (0.177) (0.238) (0.240) 
Police 1.135** 0.657 0.436 1.337** 
  (0.532) (0.502) (0.564) (0.607) 
Police in activity -0.762 -0.400 -0.0493 0.686 
  (0.909) (0.852) (0.946) (1.098) 
Age  -0.003 0.033 0.0161 0.0124 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) 
Male -0.130 -0.158 -0.011 -0.622 
 (0.480) (0.456) (0.512) (0.547) 
Trust --- 0.234** 0.217 0.462*** 
  (0.118) (0.132) (0.149) 
Political orientation --- -0.0448 -0.078 -0.049 
  (0.101) (0.113) (0.128) 
-2.019** -5.428*** -3.651*** -4.203*** Constant (0.859) (1.007) (1.159) (1.228) 
N 7680 7680 4320 3360 
Left censored obs. 5590 5590 3170 2420 
Log-likelihood -7087.22 -6442.95 -3508.05 -2798.25 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively for the 2-tailed test.  The 4320 observations correspond to the decisions of the 180 subjects observed in 
6 periods of game (one variable is lagged) for each of their other 4 group members. The 3360 observations 
correspond to 140 subjects’ decisions for each of their 4 group members in 6 periods in groups who voted for reward. 
 
 
 
	  
	  
36	  
 
Table 6. Preferences for norm enforcement institution 
 
 
Game 
 
Vote for  
institution  
 
All 
subjects 
(N=180) 
 
Police 
subjects  
(N=87) 
 
Non-police 
subjects 
(N=93) 
 
Sanction 28.00% 32.00 % 24.00 % CPR 
Reward 72.00 % 68.00 % 76.00 % 
       p=0.373 
Sanction 27.50 % 35.14 % 20.93 % VCM Reward 72.50 % 64.86 % 79.07 %        p= 0.156 
 
Note: CPR: Common Pool Resources; VCM: Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. The chi2 test whether the 
proportion voting for sanctions is different across subject pools is the same as the test whether the proportion voting 
for rewards is different since subjects had only two options.  
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Table 7. Determinants of the vote for the sanction institution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
levels, respectively for the 2-tailed test.   
 
Dependent variable:                                                  Probit model 
Vote for sanction                 (1)                                (2)                               (3) 
 
VCM game 
 
Vote with experience  
0.036 
(0.229) 
0.655*** 
0.053 
(0.242) 
0.656*** 
0.103 
(0.275) 
0.625*** 
of the game (0.194) (0.181) (0.171) 
Police  
 
Police in activity 
---- 
 
---- 
0.362* 
(0.191) 
---- 
0.294 
(0.206) 
0.398** 
   (0.193) 
Age 
 
Male  
  
Trust 
---- 
 
---- 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.051 
(0.093) 
-0.007 
-0.006 
(0.013) 
-0.055 
(0.084) 
-0.004 
  (0.009) (0.014) 
Political orientation  0.024 0.028 
  (0.026) (0.024) 
Constant -1.002*** -1.107*** -1.122*** 
 (0.283) (0.163) (0.156) 
N 
Log-likelihood 
180 
-101.38 
180 
-99.97 
180 
-99.45 
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Table 8. First-stage and final payoffs per treatment 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First-stage 
payoffs 
Final 
payoffs 
First-stage payoffs Final payoffs Treatments 
all games all games CPR VCM CPR VCM 
Baseline 
treatment 
22.96 
(5.96) 
22.96 
(5.96) 
22.73 
(6.18) 
23.24 
(5.66) 
22.73 
(6.18) 
23.24 
(5.66) 
Sanction 
treatment 
25.94 
(5.61) 
18.84 
(11.62) 
25.45 
(6.54) 
26.55 
(4.09) 
17.33 
(12.95) 
20.72 
(9.39) 
Reward  
treatment 
24.74 
(6.79) 
26.88 
(8.95) 
24.16 
(7.24) 
25.47 
(6.11) 
26.23 
(9.61) 
27.70 
(7.99) 
Vote Sanction 
treatment  
28.91 
(5.27) 
24.10 
(7.41) 
28.53 
(6.01) 
29.54 
(3.71) 
22.18 
(7.85) 
27.31 
(5.24) 
Vote Reward  
treatment 
24.13 
(6.38) 
26.65 
(9.56) 
23.68 
(6.79) 
24.64 
(5.85) 
26.28 
(10.79) 
27.08 
(7.91) 
	  
	  
39	  
 
Table 9. Determinants of payoffs 
 
GLS models 
Dependent variables 
First-stage 
payoff 
First-stage 
payoff Final payoff Final payoff 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sanction treatment 2.587*** 2.587*** -4.493*** -4.493*** 
 (0.195) (0.195) (0.287) (0.287) 
Reward treatment 1.386*** 1.386*** 3.549*** 3.549*** 
 (0.195) (0.195) (0.287) (0.287) 
Vote Sanction treatment 4.687*** 4.669*** -0.986* -1.005* 
 (0.360) (0.360) (0.529) (0.529) 
Vote Reward treatment 1.022*** 1.028*** 3.820*** 3.826*** 
 (0.213) (0.213) (0.314) (0.314) 
VCM game 0.907* 0.908* 1.628** 1.489** 
 (0.501) (0.510) (0.685) (0.696) 
Period -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.271*** -0.271*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.048) (0.048) 
Last period -0.249 -0.249 -0.726** -0.726** 
 (0.227) (0.227) (0.334) (0.334) 
Police 0.485 -0.001 0.371 -0.018 
 (0.575) (0.642) (0.786) (0.876) 
Police in activity  -0.733  -2.114 
  (0.990)  (1.350) 
Number of police subjects 
in the group  
0.638** 
(0.266)  
0.758** 
(0.363) 
Age -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.197*** -0.197*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.042) (0.042) 
Male 0.016 0.223 0.056 0.307 
 (0.538) (0.539) (0.735) (0.736) 
Trust -0.175 -0.185 -0.032 -0.050 
 (0.136) (0.135) (0.187) (0.184) 
Political orientation 0.039 0.051 0.268 0.270 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.163) (0.162) 
Constant 27.398*** 26.018*** 27.784*** 27.406*** 
 (1.125) (1.270) (1.541) (1.473) 
N 
Wald Chi 2 
R2 
5580 
496.27 
0.10 
5580 
501.40 
0.10 
5580 
1057.57 
0.15 
5580 
1062.47 
0.15 
 
Note: Baseline treatment in the CPR game is the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively for the 2-tailed test. The 5580 observations 
correspond to the 180 subjects observed in 31 periods of game. 
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Figure 1: Average contributions per treatment in the VCM games  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average contributions per treatment in the CPR games 
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Figure 3: Average contributions (i.e., amount relative to efficient outcome), in ECU  
 
 
Figure 4. Average assigned enforcement points per treatment in the VCM games 
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Figure 5. Average assigned enforcement points per treatment in the CPR game 
 
Figure 6:  Average enforcement points assigned 
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